This study was prompted by the proposal to merge a number of municipal transport undertakings into Passenger transport Authorities. The authors analyse figures showing various working expenses per bus-mile, and find no evidence of scale economies. They point out, however, that the P.T.A.s will be larger than any undertaking in their sample, and that a different conclusion might conceivably be reached if data were available on costs per passenger-mile. Extension of one-man operation appears to offer greater scope for economies than amalgamation.
Airlines on the North Atlantic run at a loss, and increased fares would not make them profitable unless capacity were sharply reduced. That might require innovations in the type of service provided, which must be settled between governments.
Professor Abouchar examines the freight schedules introduced on the brazilian railways in 1968. He concludes that they will be more inflationary than the old rates, leading to still larger deficits and to increasing demand in directions that will be harmful to national efficiency.
This paper explores the possibility that the fortress hub is a consequence of the nature of airline hub-spoke rivalry. Entry into a competitor’s local market may reduce the entrant’s profit in his own market. As a result, there is a deterrent to entry if the negative effects are strong enough. The paper also examines the impacts of local competition on consumer surplus and total social surplus.
For external validity, SP experiments need to present choices that are realistic for the respondents. The use of portable computers in interviewing has many advantages.
First, a simple theoretical model is developed that determines optimal prices for private and urban transport services in both the peak and off-peak periods of the day, taking into account all relevant private and external costs. Second, the model is implemented to study pricing policies in Belgium, using recent estimates of private and social marginal costs. Several applications are then considered.
Exceptional changes in bus and underground rail fares in London in the early 1980s prompted analyses of the effects of fare levels and petrol prices upon the numbers of road casualties in London. Earlier estimates of the number of extra casualties associated with a period of unusually high fares in the early 1980s are shown to have probably been too high.
In public transport systems with self-service fare collection passengers can decide whether to pay the fare or not. A passenger who does not pay is subject to a risk of being fined. The paper provides some empirical support for the hypothesis that passengers behave as expected utility maximisers.
Because values of time and passenger behaviour depend on the level of frequency it is found that: (1) in urban public transport there may be one low-deficit local optimum and one high-deficit local optimum, one of which is global; (2) contrary to what might be expected, optimal financial deficit per passenger is typically larger for high frequency services than for low-frequency services; (3) the optimal off-peak may exceed the optimal peak price.