Regulating a transport Company with Private Information About Costs

Regulating a transport Company with Private Information About Costs

The paper analyses three different policy regimes for regulating a transport company with private information about costs. Each policy is defined by a public monitoring strategy and a contractual relationship. By defining the expected public administrative costs of collecting information, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the different regulation systems to be compared.

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