Price Regulation and Optimal Service Standards: The Taxicab Industry

Price Regulation and Optimal Service Standards: The Taxicab Industry

In a market of cruising taxis price competition is impracticable, and service (measured by waiting time) cannot be differentiated by customers' willingness to pay. This article examines the principles governing the setting of efficient prices to attain the maximum use of the service.

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