Monopoly Exclusion of Lower Cost Entry. Loyalty Contracts in Ocean Shipping Conferences

Monopoly Exclusion of Lower Cost Entry. Loyalty Contracts in Ocean Shipping Conferences

If a lower cost entrant cannot satisfy the shipper's demand for frequency, the shipper will prefer to make loyalty contracts with the conference, so that the entrant will be effectually excluded.

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