Inter-Firm Rivalry and Firm-Specific Price Elasticities in Deregulated Airline Markets

Inter-Firm Rivalry and Firm-Specific Price Elasticities in Deregulated Airline Markets

This paper examines the pattern of a firm's pricing rivalry and its associated price elasticities in a set of duopoly routes. The parameters of the marginal cost function are also estimated. This model allows for free variation of estimated "conduct parameters" and price elasticities across airline routes.

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