Competition and the Structure of Local Bus Markets

Competition and the Structure of Local Bus Markets

The aim of entry is to capture monopoly profits by displacing the incumbent or colluding. However, entrants have generally failed to do this. Incumbents have better local knowledge, and are often financially stronger. Contrary to the Government's expectation on deregulation, the effect of potential entrants in controlling monopoly operators is weak.

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