A Model of Liner Price Setting

A Model of Liner Price Setting

An analysis of shipowners' behavior as members of a liner conference leads Dr. Abrahamsson to conclude that the price-setting practices of conferences result not only from rising costs and price maximization but from monopoly power and compensatory increases for "losses" incurred by selling surplus capacity below average cost in the tramp market.

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